Deception Operations

APPENDIX A
Deception Operations

This appendix covers deception concepts, operations, and measures, as well as PSYOP considerations in support of deception activities. Deception can support military operations across the operational continuum. Historical examples illustrate how deception has influenced various participants during peace, conflict, and war.

Deception Concepts:
Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain a competitive advantage. Political deception is achieved through diplomatic or international relations; military deception, through the acts of military forces.

The offensive is the better position from which to succeed at deception. The initiators of action define the nature of the encounter and thereby have the greater degree of control over it. A major advantage the initiative confers for successful deception is time. Although the target audience may ultimately choose not to act upon the deceptive theme, the additional time it spends evaluating deceptive scenarios or searching for further information benefits the initiator.

Deception (military or political) includes manipulating, distorting, withholding, or falsifying evidence available to an opponent. History has shown that it is far easier to deceive by reinforcing an opponent’s existing preconceptions than it is to persuade him to change his mind. PSYOP personnel should encourage the opponent that the most likely way of achieving the objective will in fact be adopted (thereby diverting his attention from an alternative plan). Given two options, one of which reinforces our existing point of view, people are more likely to believe what they already suspect. Psychologically, they are gratified by evidence that confirms their preconceptions. People generally attach undue importance to evidence supporting their point of view and reject that which does not.

PSYOP personnel should avoid deception that requires persuading a target audience of something it is not already predisposed to believe. In World War II, the Allies exploited Hitler’s (the target audience with the power) conviction that because of the problems of air cover and the need for a major port, any Allied invasion of Europe would occur at Calais.

source: Badlands